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The Curious Case of Care and 
Restorative Justice in the U.S. 
Context 
 
Margaret Urban Walker 




 “9 out of 10 Nursing Homes in U.S. Lack Adequate Staff, a 
Government Study Finds” is the title of a recent article in the New York 
Times.1 The reported study, ordered by the U. S. Congress in 1990 
and prepared by the Department of Health and Human Services, 
concludes that 90% of U.S. nursing homes have too few workers to 
provide “minimally necessary” care and that nursing homes with a low 
ratio of nursing personnel were more likely to provide substandard 
care that endangers life and health of residents. Yet the report 
considers minimum staffing ratios “not currently feasible” because of 
costs. The Bush administration agrees, rejecting minimum staffing 
regulation in favor of publishing data on staffing levels so that an 
“informed public” can create the “market demand” for better nursing 
home staffing. 
The report and coverage of it are unexceptional in exhibiting the 
stark absence in U.S. political culture of a discursive and moral 
framework of care. Even in a context where talk of “care” is 
descriptively unavoidable – providing for the sick and frail aged – talk 
of care as a value, obligation, or responsibility is absent. Instead, the 
report and the newspaper article repeatedly articulate the situation in 
terms of unacceptable cost, economic realism, and individual 
responses to market forces as a solution. Those elderly needing care 
are positioned as a costly social problem, and the Times inserts the 
alarming fact that the 85 and older population will double by 2030. 
There is a pattern here. The “welfare to work” agenda of the 1990s in 
the U.S. acquiesced in framing the “welfare mother” – not poverty, 
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inadequate social support, bad schools, lack of affordable and reliable 
childcare, runaway male incarceration in nonwhite race groups – as a 
social problem that had become too expensive to tolerate. In recent 
years “education” is retooled as a mainstream and cost-free political 
bandwagon implemented through standardized testing that ignores 
growing levels of child poverty in the U.S. So too inadequate nursing 
homes – another paradigmatic “care” problem – become a target for 
economic containment strategies rather than a trigger of moral shame. 
And yet there is an area of activity, experiment, and activism in 
the U.S. that crosses public and private boundaries where not only are 
care values invoked but care discourse is made central, and where 
these values and their discursive frame seems politically acceptable 
and even popularly digestible. The area is restorative justice as an 
ethical vision and a set of practical strategies for dealing with victims 
and offenders of crime and their communities. Restorative justice, 
even though marginal, seems to be rising in visibility and in 
persuasiveness even as incarceration in the U.S. has soared to 
unprecedented levels. It is entering mainstream thinking both from the 
bottom-up efforts of private organizations and advocates and from the 
top-down institution of state programs to deal with criminal offenders 
and victims of crime. 
I will use this case to open a discussion of why the an ethic of 
care seems to have achieved expression in such unexpected quarters 
even as it remains largely excluded from the U.S. public figuration of 
social and political problems that are seemingly more obvious sites for 
normative discussions of care – the needs of vulnerable children, the 
physically and mentally ill, the sick and frail elderly. Where these 
“care” problems are not represented largely in terms of economic 
calculation – that is to say, where they are represented in moral terms 
at all – they are most likely to be shaped by appeals to rights: the 
rights of children, rights to health care, rights to dignity in old age. Yet 
in the domain of spreading restorative justice practice one hears 
repeatedly about the needs of the victim, the offender, and harboring 
communities; the importance of empathy, attention, and the candid 
expression of feeling; and the importance of sustaining and repairing 
human relations in an environment where victims and offenders are 
supported by their communities of care. 
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I begin looking at some identifying commitments of care ethics, 
attempting not to elevate one particular version but to focus themes 
and language that reveal care thinking.2 I then turn to a brief look at 
some of the theoretical and practical activity in the growing area of 
restorative justice as an approach to crime, exploring how the clearly 
moral language that legitimates restorative justice programs is, rather 
surprisingly, a language of care. Finally, I raise some questions about 
the complexities of how an ethical discourse of care is marginalized 
and deflated by its gendered associations in its most obvious sphere, 
but is also eclipsed or captured by communitarian, therapeutic, and 
religious discourses that can deflect the potential of care ethics to 
assume its role as a public moral discourse. 
In all this, I do not suggest that the perspective of care ethics 
enjoys more than a liminal existence in U.S. public life. In fact, my 
hypothesis is that the saturation of the restorative justice movement 
with care discourse is an exception that proves the rule, while helping 
to illuminate what the rule is. Care language can find public expression 
where it is not identified as such, nor identified with traditionally 
feminized arenas of care. Care discourse is excluded from those areas 
where it threatens to spill the “private” sphere into the public one just 
where the particular public/private boundary in question is one that 
has been historically, and continues largely to be, gendered. Where 
care language carries the load of the sentimental, feminine, servile, 
and domestic spheres, it is not serious discourse for public policy 
debate in the U.S. In the area of criminal justice policy, heavily 
gendered masculine in its target population (male offenders), its 
personnel (criminal lawyers, judges, corrections official, prison 
personnel), and its public imagery (crime as a male domain and a 
hypermasculine behavior), care language is marginal but can be 
entertained as an “alternative philosophy.” Even there, however, the 
philosophy in question is virtually never identified with “care ethics,” 
but most commonly with a (loosely) communitarian and/or explicitly 
religious frame. In some instances, ideas and practices that embody 
care values are celebrated as a legacy of indigenous cultures, now a 
benefit of a multicultural society that can learn from people and 
lifeways it once attempted to exterminate. 
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The “Information Base” of Care Ethics 
Substantive affinities between an ethic of care and an ethic of 
capabilities have been noticed, by political theorist of care Joan Tronto 
and philosopher of dependency work Eva Kittay.3 Here I borrow a 
methodological rather than a substantive idea employed by economist 
and capabilities theorist Amartya Sen. In Development as Freedom 
Sen contrasts theories of justice by examining the “information base” 
that they select as decisive for addressing the problems that they 
would answer.4 For example, utilitarians seek to answer questions of 
social policy by directing attention to subjective satisfaction or the 
fulfillment of preferences, while Rawlsian theory focuses on liberties, 
income, and self-respect as primary goods in addressing the justice of 
societies’ basic institutions. Sen emphasizes that identifying the 
information base of moral theories -- the considerations they make 
relevant and irrelevant in deciding moral issues -- can be crucial in 
testing the scope and adequacy of theories in response to a question 
like “What is a just society?” 
Identifying the information base of divergent theories is also, 
however, a useful way to reveal that theories that superficially appear 
to be answering the same question from different views of the same 
subject matter at hand are often in fact constructing different subject 
matters for our view. In the political deployment of moral discourses, 
this is especially important to notice. Often what is politically decisive 
is whether a certain kind of consideration or problem can be made 
visible as something to be concerned about before any substantive 
normative conclusions about it are reached, before political positions 
on it are hardened as “issues,” or before decisions of policy about it 
are taken. The constitution of subject matters for moral and political 
concern, and the replacement or displacement of some subject 
matters by others, are a powerful process in sustaining what 
philosopher Cheshire Calhoun has called “ideologies of the moral life,” 
those non-logical implications of styles of theorizing or discussion that 
make some questions and considerations seem inevitable, important, 
or natural and make others seem exceptional, deviant, secondary, or 
unimportant.5 
Using this lens, how might we characterize the information base 
of care ethics in addressing questions about a just and morally 
responsible society? 
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I suggest that care ethics can be seen (without adopting one 
particular formulation of it) in terms of three key facts and four central 
value commitments. Call the first fact the fact of dependency as an 
inevitable feature of the human cycle of life; all begin in radical and 
fragile dependency, all experience it in times of illness, weakness, and 
disability during life, and all who grow old enough are very likely to 
return to it as an ongoing way of living. Call the second fact the fact of 
vulnerability as an unavoidable feature of human beings’ fragile bodies 
and feelings. Both of these are features that social arrangements can 
render more or less threatening or fearsome to human beings by 
providing forms of care and protection. Call the third the fact of 
interdependence as an ineliminable feature of human social existence. 
As we are dependent upon others for our very survival at the outset 
and at many times in our lives, we are dependent on many others 
throughout our lives for the necessities and amenities of a tolerable or 
a good life. Social divisions of labor and social ties and memberships 
make possible much of what any of us values beyond bare survival, 
while specific modes of social organization and cultural norms make 
only certain forms of interdependence visible and valued. These three 
facts encompass the primary information base of care ethics, which is 
tapped by the question: what do people need from each other to live 
well in the world?6 
As a perspective on moral value, with directive force for 
individual choices and for social institutions and political policies, care 
ethics elevates four goods: responsiveness to human needs; 
responsibility and competence in meeting needs; valuing of connection 
and relationship itself; and valuing of caring labor and activities. In the 
face of dependency, vulnerability, and interdependence as our 
unalterable human condition, care ethics holds individuals and their 
societies responsible for attending to, assessing, and weighing 
responsibilities for human needs and for acknowledging our needs for 
each other. Care ethics affirms the dignity and profound importance of 
our efforts to meet human needs, most so those needs at stake in 
conditions of vulnerability that threaten survival or in relations of 
dependency on which survival and health depend. While these values 
need not be seen as comprising a complete ethics, care ethics sees 
these as values without which no ethical vision is adequate or, more 
strongly, humanly sane.7 
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This leads care ethics to identify as fundamental problems of 
justice the distribution of caring (who gets taken care of), the 
distribution of responsibilities to engage in caring labor (who gives 
care), and distributions of the social resources and protections 
available to care-givers and those needing care (on what terms of 
burden and reward people give and receive care). These problems 
have often, bizarrely, not been treated as moral issues at all, or have 
been bifurcated into “realms” or “spheres” which elevate the executive 
functions of organizing care-delivery (as in the modern welfare state) 
to the status of issues of “public” justice, while demoting actual care-
giving to the “private” sphere of unskilled, low-waged or unpaid work 
that must get done but is not worth paying (much) for.8 Care ethics, 
however, need not be restricted to those activities that are seen as 
“care-giving” in the most stereotypical sense. As Selma Sevenhuijsen 
says, “practically all human behaviour carries aspects or dimensions of 
care.”9 Rather, the vision of care ethics is one of “a relational ethics 
which places the highest value on the promotion, restoration, or 
creation of good social and personal relations and gives priority to the 
needs and concerns of ‘concrete’ [i.e. particular]...others,” in Fiona 
Robinson’s words.10 Flexible attentiveness to the individual case, 
mindfulness of and responsiveness to needs of particular human 
beings, valuing relations of interdependence and the activities of care 
that sustain them, are marks of care values in all contexts. 
An Unexpected Arena for Care Ethics 
Care language and values are largely absent in contemporary 
public, politically authoritative discussion in the U.S. in those contexts 
where one would naturally expect them to have some weight.11 At the 
same time a restorative justice movement has emerged within and 
around the U.S. criminal justice system, and this movement, in both 
its governmental and nongovernmental forms, speaks a language that 
is in fact, whatever its origins, identical to the language of care. It is 
not the case that care ethics has been the chosen framework for the 
development of restorative justice ideas and ideals. Rather, the case of 
restorative justice is interesting to reflect on because it is an 
(increasingly) institutionally recognized and legitimate discourse with 
some significant practical impact that is organized around moral ideas 
indistinguishable from care thinking. A care-based approach achieves 
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at least the legitimacy of a practical policy alternative in the U.S. 
criminal justice domain. 
Although many became aware of the idea of “restorative justice” 
through world-wide interest in South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, the concept of restorative justice already had a history in 
criminal justice practice two decades before. Innovations in the form of 
victim-offender conferences seeking offender accountability and 
restoration of victim losses began in Canada and U.S. in the mid 
1970s.12 Once the concept was in play, it steered attention toward 
varied social practices in many cultures, some of them ancient, that fit 
the basic idea.13 New Zealand’s extensive family conferencing program 
was based explicitly on long-standing practice of Maori culture; 
sentencing circles in Canada and the U.S. embody First Nations 
practices in Canada and have been adopted in some African-American 
communities; the Navajo Peacemaker Courts in Arizona continue or 
revive pre-conquest practices of communal deliberation under the 
direction of a respected individual.14 Immarigeon and Daly helpfully 
survey multiple “streams” of thought and activism that have flowed 
into restorative justice practice, including victims’ and prisoners’ rights 
movement, feminist activism on rape and domestic violence, the 
ascendance of mediation and alternative dispute resolution, indigenous 
traditions, the peacemaking practices of religious communities, and 
popular sentiment. All sought more responsiveness to victims, or less 
incarceration and more genuine accountability in the case of (at least 
non-violent) offenders, or more community representation, or more 
than one of these.15 
Restorative justice is an international movement in theory and 
practice that is also thriving in the U.S. An extensive system of 
Reparative Probation Boards exists in Vermont and websites for 
agencies of the states of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and 
Michigan advertise their restorative justice ventures. The state of 
Arizona, with its deserved reputation for tough penal practices has just 
revamped and renamed its Victims’ Rights Program as the “Office of 
Restorative Justice” to emphasize policies that involve crime victims in 
the process of dealing with juvenile offenders. Academic conferences 
and training courses for restorative mediation can easily be found on 
the web, as can nongovernmental and religious organizations that 
advance restorative justice, like the Mennonite Central Council (an 
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originator of U.S. victim-offender reconciliation programs), the 
Formation and Justice Ministries of the United Methodist Church in 
Missouri, or the Victim offender Mediation Association, a network of 
theorists, researchers, and practitioners.16 Restorative justice is a 
banner both for inventing and adopting new programs for dealing with 
the aftermath of crime (as well as other community or school discord 
and violence) in ways other than, or in addition to, punitive measures. 
Restorative justice framing also gives a fresh face, and perhaps a 
slightly different meaning, to some existing programs, like community 
policing or victim-witness assistance. 
Although there are differences of philosophy and practice within 
restorative justice networks and programs, the key ideas are quite 
uniform. A concise definition of restorative practice by Bazemore and 
Walgrave is: “restorative justice is every action that is primarily 
oriented toward doing justice by repairing the harm that has been 
caused by a crime.”17 Crime is understood as a concrete harm to 
specific persons and to their communities, and restoration has 
material, emotional, and moral dimensions. The contrast, which is 
usually explicit and always implied, is with a retributive criminal 
system that gives the offender, at best, what is “deserved” in the way 
of punishment according to a system of pre-calibrated punishments for 
scaled offenses, and typically gives the victim nothing but the possible 
satisfaction of seeing the offender punished. Restorative justice is 
committed to putting the repair of harm done by crime in the hands of 
the “stakeholders,” defined as the victims, the offender, and their 
“communities of care.” 
Restorative justice is typically done through court-administered 
or police-run programs where authorities linked to the criminal justice 
system orchestrate forms of conference between offenders, victims, 
and in some cases families or representatives of affected communities. 
The scene of restorative justice is a meeting or conference among 
these “stakeholders” in various combinations. Participation in 
restorative programs is ostensibly voluntary on the part of the 
principals, and the function of the meeting is to repair damage by 
doing at least some of the following: hearing the experience of victims 
(and communities) about the concrete harms of crime, allowing 
offenders to take responsibility for the offense, providing information, 
explanation, apology and offers of reparative action, arriving at an 
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agreement about the course of action to be taken to repair the harm.18 
The substantive values of restorative practice are repair and “healing.” 
Restorative justice programs are most popular (and one assumes, 
politically acceptable) for juveniles, but adult and (in some cases) 
violent offenders may also be considered candidates for restorative 
intervention. Restorative programs in criminal justice systems 
presuppose the offender has admitted guilt, and may be a diversion 
from a court process or an adjunct or sequel to trial; in some cases 
they may be available to those already incarcerated. 
What is striking is the language used consistently in both 
theoretical writing and practical contexts in discussing restorative 
justice practice. The focus of restorative practice is the needs created 
by the fact of a harm or crime and a corresponding obligation to 
respond by addressing those particular needs; the importance of 
direct, attentive (sometimes respectful or compassionate) listening 
and expression (ideally, face to face) between parties to the harmful 
event; the opportunity for the offender to take responsibility and 
directly respond to the victim’s anguish, anger, fear, and suffering; 
and the assumption that parties to the process will arrive at a solution 
that does justice in the particular case at hand without supposing that 
the resolution of a restorative intervention must conform to an 
antecedent rule or be replicated in like cases.19 Sullivan and Tifft 
describe restorative justice as a “needs-based conception of justice” 
and literature on programs often speaks of balancing needs of victims, 
offenders, and communities. It is also about human relations which 
individuals have powers to break and repair, rather than rules or laws 
the transgression of which “belongs” to the State.20 The process 
emphasis is on direct expression and acknowledgment of needs and 
feelings, the substantive emphasis on accountability and concrete 
response that addresses needs, material, emotional, and moral, and in 
which victim and offender often literally address each other. In 
conferences that involve communities – often referred to as 
“communities of care” – communities are expected to provide support 
within a context that does not blur the roles of victim and offender, but 
that allows the offender an opportunity to assert agency and 
competence by taking responsibility for making a meaningful 
reparative response to the victim. This often includes apology as well 
as some attempt at restitution or symbolic amends. The substantive 
value of “restoration” in restorative justice rests heavily on what 
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victims, offenders, and communities see as repair, but the structure of 
restorative practices makes clear that connection among the parties, 
and where possible reconnection of people within their communities 
(sometimes called reintegration for offenders, following Braithwaite) is 
the ideal (if not always available) end of restorative justice practice. It 
thus sets itself in opposition to the alienating, distancing, and 
depersonalizing effects of an adversarial criminal process that treats 
crime as an offense against the state, that encourages offenders to 
deny responsibility, that exiles offenders through incarceration and 
stigmatization, and that excludes offenders from an active role in 
“setting things right,” making them spectators to the harm they have 
done and even to some of its consequences for them.21 
The keynote themes of care thinking are pervasive in restorative 
justice literature and practice. Restorative justice practice, of course, is 
a tiny patch on the huge and still swelling incarceration industry into 
which the U.S. criminal justice establishment has metastasized. Annual 
expenditures on prisons have increased more than 500% in the last 
two decades, and state prison budgets are growing in the U.S. while 
social services are being cut.22 The U.S. currently incarcerates more 
people than any other country in the world, including mainland China. 
A large majority of those incarcerated are nonviolent offenders.23 
Racism is rampant in this “justice” system. By 1994 it is estimated 
that one of every three Black males between 18 and 34 years in the 
U.S. was under some form of correctional supervision.24 No doubt one 
of the factors driving interest in alternative models of dealing with 
crime is precisely the frightening growth, expense, racism, and 
inhumanity of this system. But why has care ethical thinking managed 
to get a hearing, and more than that, a hold (even if experimental) in 
this field? What can we make of this? 
Some Speculations about U.S. Resistance to Care 
Talk 
The case of restorative justice shows that the values and points 
of focus of care ethics can in fact become a legitimate and legitimating 
discourse in a significant area of public policy in the U.S., even if its 
impact is relatively slight. This has not happened because these 
practices and rationales are labeled or promoted as “an ethic of care.” 
Researchers on the origins of restorative justice theory and practice 
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acknowledge some contribution of women’s movements and feminism 
to restorative thinking, but no one considers this more than a slight, 
and perhaps indirect, contribution, and that contribution may well be 
through feminist uses of “rights” discourses, rather than care ethics.25 
It seems few researchers have explored this link or deployed care 
ethics as a main theoretical rationale.26 
Restorative justice thinking has been fed by many streams, 
including community policing movements, victims’ rights movements, 
religious organizations, and communitarian thinking. Restorative 
justice practice embodies a robust and consistent version of care 
ethics even though it rarely appears under that description. Its 
language of “community participation,” of “needs of the victim,” of the 
“competence” and “accountability” of the offender, of the goal of 
“restoring victims, offenders, and communities,” can be heard in 
various registers, ideologically and practically, and perhaps this is 
important. There is no sense that the values are “feminist,” where the 
latter term continues to arouse prickly, defensive, and derisive feelings 
in many quarters in the U.S. One might then say that care ethics, in 
the U.S. context, works best by another name, or in tandem with other 
perspectives that are more acceptable to a broad U.S. public. Certainly 
a broad U.S. public is responsive to talk based on ostensibly Christian 
values. Perhaps more importantly, Christian and communitarian 
perspectives embody values that do not seem threatening, suspect, or 
too “radical” in the U.S. social imaginary. Christian religious appeals 
and communitarian language generally are comfortable ones for most 
Americans. At any rate, these frameworks appear politically viable to 
(still overwhelmingly) white male Christian middle-class lawmakers, 
administrators, and bureaucrats. For this reason, these orientations 
are able to carry legitimacy, and their acceptance by those in power 
reinforces whatever legitimacy they possess in the first place. 
In a different way, so does the idea of indigenous tradition carry 
some appeal. Of course, honoring or reviving indigenous traditions of 
peace-making and communal harmony have independent importance 
as they embody respect for peoples and cultures long subjugated and 
actively threatened with extermination. Restorative justice programs 
rooted in local or traditional indigenous practice can thus be ways to 
affirm forms of self-determination and control for these populations.27 
Also, for a political and criminal justice establishment premised on 
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Euro-American liberal individualist and modern statist culture, 
indigenous ideas and values that emphasize community and 
participation can be seen as refreshingly new and useful alternatives 
for the dominant culture. Perhaps these ideas derive some appeal 
when they are seen as benefits of “multiculturalism.” The idea of 
multiculturalism has become at least familiar and has positive 
associations for many white Americans of European descent, even if 
these same citizens are not familiar or comfortable with the people 
whose cultures supply this diversity, much less with the idea that 
Native peoples are minority nations, rather than a minority group.28 
Compared to the Christian, communitarian, and even 
multicultural appeals of restorative thinking, my guess is that its 
feminist credentials are unimpressive or worse. A discourse that can 
be identified as feminist is still likely to evoke a defensive backlash in a 
U.S. context; at any rate it will be easily labeled as socially or 
politically “radical.” It is important to clarify my point: I do not mean 
to say that what is “really” going on here is care ethics, not 
communitarianism, or the traditions of indigenous people, or the 
religious values of faith communities. Instead, what we see is a 
remarkable overlap among moral views that in various ways repudiate 
aspects of liberal individualist, formal universalist, and theoretical-
juridical understandings of morality and society.29 My point is not that 
restorative justice uniquely requires or exhibits a care ethics 
perspective, but that it shows that values wholly consistent with and 
central to that perspective can get a hearing that they do not 
necessarily get when advanced as care ethics. 
It need not be, of course, that restorative justice practices are 
being adopted because of the caring, or communitarian, or Christian, 
or indigenous values that support them. Practices gain currency and 
are seen as institutional options for many reasons, and perhaps for 
different reasons by different interested parties.30 The question here, 
however, is not about the actual political conditions, social forces, and 
distributions of power that explain the adoption of restorative justice 
practices, although that is an important question, and one on which 
the success of institutionalizing restorative justice programs is likely to 
depend. The issue I am exploring is the relative acceptability and 
effectiveness of different discourses as legitimating ones in a public 
sphere, in this case, the contemporary U.S. 
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Whatever the actual reasons for the adoption of certain 
practices, some languages of value and justification are found 
acceptable and effective in presenting and justifying these practices to 
the public, or are offered as the terms in which policy options are to be 
understood by the public. The question I have been asking here is, 
why do care language and values (under whatever banner) qualify as 
legitimating with respect to restorative justice practice, making their 
way onto websites and into state-manufactured pamphlets, but remain 
relatively ineffective and unlegitimating in their more obvious areas of 
application to the care of the young, the frail, the sick, or other 
dependent persons? There are really two questions here. One is: why 
does care language get a successful grip in the case of restorative 
justice, when it does not seem to do so elsewhere, including in the 
more obvious realms of application? I have already suggested that the 
language and values of care used to couch rationales for restorative 
justice can be and are actually subsumed under politically safer or 
more acceptable evaluative outlooks that share care language and 
values. The second question is: Why is care language often ignored or 
spurned in those more obvious realms? Couldn’t it achieve some 
stature there, if perhaps under different descriptions, as in the 
restorative justice case? In response to this, I focus on two linked 
factors. On the one hand, there is a special “contamination by the 
feminine” that is unavoidable for caring discourse in its more obvious 
realms of application, for these areas of needs for care and caring 
remain, in reality and perception, largely associated with women and 
(so) with the “private” sphere. At the same time, there is a real threat 
– social and economic – that care thinking represents to the gendered 
and raced division of labor that has allowed U.S. society to continue to 
“ride free,” or at least artificially cheaply, on the strained and 
inadequate but private (that is, domestic or privately paid) provision of 
care in these most obvious spheres. 
These two factors–a symbolic contamination and a real threat 
might explain rejection and delegitimation in the U.S. public sphere of 
the discourse of care precisely where it is applied to still deeply 
feminized spheres.” Care talk addresses the still conspicuously 
gendered sectors of what Eva Kittay calls “dependency work,” paid and 
unpaid, which work is also historically “raced and classed” in Joan 
Tronto’s phrase.31 That is, care talk is more alarming personally, 
socially, and institutionally when it threatens to breach the 
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private/public boundary in its gendered (and also raced) form. The 
dynamics here are complicated, mixing practical, social economic, and 
symbolic factors. 
An ethic of care is threatening in the imagined U.S. public space 
of supposedly competent, self-sufficient, free individuals who are 
pictured as enjoying full reciprocity of obligation and entitlement. Care 
thinking instead demands attention to those who engage in unpaid and 
low paid dependency work and these are people -- put curtly, women 
and minorities -- whose labor has been and continues to be exploited 
within a system of socially restricted choices and opportunities in the 
U.S. An ethic of care further demands attention to those who are 
dependent and so rely upon this work. U.S. social and political 
discourse struggles with inserting the “care-giver” and the “human 
being needing care” into the citizen role and inserting the continuous 
human needs for care into the picture of the independent, 
autonomously rights-wielding citizen as a culturally normative ideal. 
The culturally normative U.S. citizen is an adult, a classically rational 
actor, a “man” whose life cycle is not socially premised on child-
bearing and child-care, a white person fitted for education that leads 
to more than menial work (that is suitably done by those of other 
races), a person with a life planned for security and self-sufficiency 
who enjoys the social and economic resources to make such plans 
realistic. The ethics of care can appear alienating and actually 
distressing to many Americans who want to be that citizen or want to 
believe they actually are and will continue to be that citizen. It is 
comforting to picture the dependent as the exception or and the care-
giver as someone else. Perhaps it is more alienating and distressing to 
men than to women given the (growing) gender gaps in polls and in 
elections where women in the U.S. are significantly more concerned 
with active government support for social welfare and health care. At 
least it would seem, put flatly, that while the public sphere of policy 
and legislation remains overwhelmingly dominated in the U.S. by 
higher-educated white men, it remains easier to see dependency and 
the caring labor it requires as someone else’s problem so long as it is 
in fact someone else’s problem. 
Furthermore, when care ethics justifies increased demands on 
public resources, it collides with the discourse of “costly social 
problems.” When the necessity of responding socially to human 
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vulnerability and dependency is framed in this way, it expresses 
resistance to paying for what has been and usually still is free, and 
otherwise is cheaper than it would be under moderately fair conditions 
of occupational choice and compensation. Care of the dependent and 
vulnerable remains commonly done by women as an unpaid full time 
job or an unpaid double or triple shift in the home in addition to paid 
labor; or is done as low paid “unskilled” work performed by a 
disproportionately nonwhite labor force in the workplace (where that 
workplace is also sometimes someone else’s home, in the case of 
home care attendants, babysitters, housecleaners).32 These social 
needs are indeed costly to meet, but the issue is where the cost is to 
be placed. The discourse of “costly social problems” evinces resistance 
and resentment to paying a cost that really “should” not be a public 
“burden,” and in which those who constitute the burden are a 
“problem.” I suspect that the criminal justice sector is open to care 
talk and caring values because there it does not threaten to breach an 
economic, social, and political barrier that represents and is 
represented by the feminized and raced version of the “private” 
sector: unpaid or minimally paid dependency work that can be socially 
demanded from or socially assigned to women and people of color 
(who may also be non-citizens). Criminal justice has been a public 
concern solidly for at least the last century in the U.S.33 The kind of 
privatization that tempts a grotesquely overgrown and massively 
expensive U.S. corrections establishment is the economic lure of 
offloading corrections to private industries. The loaded associations of 
the gendered and raced sphere of “private” or “domestic” activity have 
no place here.34 
Finally, if “crime” (in the popular imagination, violent crime) 
encourages us to be anxious about our vulnerability to predators, that 
vulnerability can be made to seem avoidable if we build enough 
prisons, pass enough draconian sentencing legislation, hire enough 
police and give them enough coercive powers. This is perhaps why 
restorative justice has found uptake in the U.S. mostly in connection 
with juvenile offenders and with nonviolent adults, even as the 
incarcerations establishment swells. There remains an interest in 
keeping people believing that they are vulnerable to violent crime and 
that more incarceration is the way to limit that vulnerability. This 
interest is consistent with introducing alternatives for lawbreakers who 
are not “a menace to society,” and perhaps serves even to reinforce 
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that idea that people are in prison because they are dangerous (even 
as admissions to federal prison now are overwhelmingly for nonviolent 
violation of drug laws). In any case, this kind of “controllable” 
vulnerability – incessantly magnified by politicians’ rhetoric and the 
popular press – is very different from the forms of vulnerability and 
dependency we all cannot avoid, no matter what we build or buy, or 
whom we bully. 
The language of care in its most characteristic applications reminds 
people of a largely uncontrollable vulnerability, and its implications for 
dependency and interdependence, that is immensely less disturbing 
when it remains private in another sense, that is, when it remains not 
only less socially expensive but also out of sight and out of mind (until 
it strikes at home). The caring language of restorative justice escapes 
the charged resistance and the sense of threat carried by care ethics 
when it is identified as such – as care ethics – and applied in the most 
obvious places. This is, I have suggested, precisely because care 
ethics unavoidably brings unwelcome reminders that we are all both 
responsible for, and in need of, the massive work of caring on which all 
human societies rest. U.S. society, the only remaining industrial 
society without universal health care coverage and with negligible 
publicly supported provisions for parental or other child care, does not 
seem ready for a collective public acknowledgment of this truth and its 
political, social, and personal implications.35 
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